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Abstract 
The research investigates ownership structure in Indonesia in context of agency theory 
for non-financial firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for 2000-2007 periods. 
The uniqueness of characteristic of ownership structure in Indonesia, which is dominated 
by large institutional shareholders motivated researcher to examine the impact and its 
relationship to agency conflict and balancing off agency theory in Indonesian companies. 
In this condition, it is certainly indicating that the existing conflict is not between 
managers and owners but majority and minority.  
The study argues that in low level ownership, controlling institutional shareholder 
expropriates the minority shareholders. However, when the ownerships comes to higher 
level, the controlling shareholder will make agency conflict lower since monitoring 
hypothesis becoming relevant in such level. In other words, the study argues that nonlinear 
relation between agency conflict which is proxied by firm’s performance ratios and 
controlling institutional ownership exist. Nevertheless, the study argues that debt and 
dividend policy can also be used to reduce the conflict. Thus, the study also examines the 
simultaneous relationships among the mechanisms used to reduce agency conflict.  
The result indicates that when controlling institutional shareholder has significant 
amount of shares, they will actively monitor the manager to ensure them making value. 
However, when the ownership is insignificant, controlling shareholder will harm firm 
value due to expropriation of controlling shareholder. Therefore, nonlinear relationship 
exists between controlling institutional shareholder and agency conflict. Second, debt 
policy and dividend policy can be used to reduce the conflict. The last, it is found that 
balancing off agency theory is not applied among all policies. The only bidirectional 
relationship is between institutional ownership and debt policy.  
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